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Abstract: Social engineering attacks are possibly one of the most dangerous forms of security and
privacy attacks since they are technically oriented to psychological manipulation and have been
growing in frequency with no end in sight. This research study assessed the major aspects and
underlying concepts of social engineering attacks and their influence in the New Zealand banking
sector. The study further identified attack stages and provided a user-reflective model for the
mitigation of attacks at every stage of the social engineering attack cycle. The outcome of this research
was a model that provides users with a process of having a reflective stance while engaging in online
activities. Our model is proposed to aid users and, of course, financial institutions to re-think their
anti-social engineering strategies while constantly maintaining a self-reflective assessment of whether
they are being subjected to social engineering attacks while transacting online.
Keywords: social engineering attack; cyber-attacks; phishing; malware; New Zealand; banking
1. Introduction
Over the last 10 years, digitalization has revolutionized commercial and social collaborations.
It has changed the way business, training, communication and data sharing are conducted.
Advancements in information technology, especially the internet, has opened an era of opportunities
for organizations, especially for the banking sector, to serve their customers through new channels.
From small-scale transactions to corporate operations, transactions are now made in an instant due
to advancements in technology. This has led people all over the world to depend on the banking
system for various financial transactions since it provides a secure, safe and convenient way to create
a good financial future. However, with the ease of banking operations comes several threats and
vulnerabilities, which have affected this industry. The banking industry has been exposed to numerous
security and privacy vulnerabilities.
Cybercriminals are mindful of this upheaval and are taking full advantage of vulnerabilities
in the banking system. A survey by Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC), a multinational professional
services network, reported that 93% of financial institutions suffered security breaches in 2016, with a
trend indicative of an exponential growth in cyber-attacks [1]. The key challenge in cyber security is
providing protection and countering cyber-attacks whilst keeping up-to-date with growing challenges.
The significance of cyber security varies according to business needs, market pressures, investment
into emerging markets, business modernization prerequisites, and budget. However, billions of
dollars have been invested into the financial sector of the global market to counter cyber-attacks [2].
Cybercriminals have made and are continuously making profound efforts to find advanced methods
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for hacking the banking system in dynamic ways. Of several kinds of cyber-attacks, one is the social
engineering attack. Social engineering attacks have become a real source of worry to the management
of banking institutions, since many of their customers have been the victims of this kind of attack [3].
Social engineering attacks are one of the cyber-attacks that use human behavior to collect information
to circumvent the security policies of a bank instead of using technical means of attack on systems [4].
The authors in [5] investigated and found that 64% of New Zealanders did not know of existing New
Zealand cyber security issues, while 40% of those who understood the cyber security issues expressed
that New Zealand lacks good secure cyber policies.
This research study assessed the major aspects and underlying concepts related to social
engineering attacks, and its influence in the New Zealand banking sector. In addition, a user-reflective
mitigation model was proposed. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides an in-depth literature review, which is carried out to analyze social engineering types and
approaches. The significance of understanding social engineering attacks is established based on a
statistical study conducted in New Zealand over the past five years. In Section 3, we utilize the results
of this study to offer measures to address social engineering attacks, proposing a simple model for the
mitigation of attacks. In Section 4, a model is proposed that provides users with a reflective stance that
while they are online conducting their activities, they could be subjects of an ongoing online social
engineering attack. Our model, therefore, provides the means to verify and reflect at every stage that
online users are not victims, and, if they are, they can identify what stage of the attack they are in
and take precautionary steps to avert or mitigate the attack. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude and
provide some final thoughts on online banking threats and the need to maintain a continuous reflective
consciousness of the possibility of social engineering attacks while online.
2. Background
2.1. Banking and Cyber-Attacks
The financial service sector is extremely diverse. According to the US Department of Treasury [2],
financial services include thousands of banking institutions; providers of venture products, insurance
concerns, credit and financing firms; and critical financial utility providers and their supporting
service functions. Financial sectors vary extensively in size, ranging from some of the largest global
banking companies with thousands of employees and billions of dollars in assets, to small credit
unions and local community banks that have only a few number of employees but serve individual
communities [2,6]. The financial sector forms the backbone of the global economy, with broad
networks and systems across the world. Due to advancements in information and communication
technology (ICT), the volume and value of transactions among financial institutions have grown
enormously in recent years. This has resulted in transaction complexities and security concerns.
Financial transaction service entities are connected through telecommunication systems in multiple
ways. Further, third-party services such as SWIFT and Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) have
external relationships with the banking sector, which has added to the complexity, as well as the
susceptibility, of the system [6]. This has led banking operational methods and risk management
strategies to be more reliant on main service providers. For instance, instant messaging services are
used to transmit information regarding banking transactions, which include details about the payer,
the payee and the transferred amount. SWIFT is an example of a third-party provider which connects
financial systems across the world. It provides a messaging platform to the financial sector, connecting
more than 200 countries together [6]. Even though interconnectedness and closer public connections
have helped the banking sector to build a strong infrastructure and global payment facilities, several
risks and susceptibilities can trigger cyber-attacks. In addition, the financial industry is coming to
the understanding that these threats have become significantly complicated [7]. The complex nature
of banking systems and practices makes it hard to respond to or detect threats in the event of an
organized cyber-attack, as in the case of Coincheck–a Japanese-based cryptocurrency platform that
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was hacked to the tune of US$530 million [8]. To compound the issue, security specialists believe that
the trend and frequency of threats will continue to grow [7].
2.2. The New Zealand Banking System
According to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, there are 24 registered banks in New Zealand [9].
The concept of internet banking in New Zealand developed during the significant upgrade of modern
telecommunication infrastructure and internetworking. This provided a favorable environment for the
establishment of online financial services over the public network. In 1996, ASB (Auckland Savings
Bank) first introduced internet banking, offering several services through their branches across New
Zealand [10]. This was followed by Bank Direct, which commenced internet banking in mid-1997. Bank
of New Zealand (BNZ) and National Bank of New Zealand (NBNZ) later followed suite. In early 2001,
Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) and Westpac both enabled online banking. The last bank to offer
internet banking facilities was Kiwi Bank in 2002. During that period, more than 90 percent of the online
internet banking market was controlled by ANZ, ASB, BNZ and Westpac [11]. According to Statistics
New Zealand [12], approximately 2.25 million Kiwis use online banking facilities through their mobile
phones or desktop/laptops to check daily transactions, while the population of New Zealand stands at
4.6 million [12]. In New Zealand, typical online banking services include daily transactions, payments,
product applications, mortgage/loan calculators, location services and contacts.
2.3. Social Engineering Attacks
According to Christopher Hadnagy, the term social engineering is defined as “the act of
manipulating a person to take an action that may or may not be in the target’s best interest” [13].
In contrast to this definition, SANS Institute describes social engineering as “a euphemism for
non-technical or low-technology means—such as lies, impersonation, tricks, bribes, blackmail and
threats used to attack information systems” [14]. The descriptions above provide an insight into how
social engineering attacks rely purely on the human factor. An attacker may use human behavior as a
tool to attack information systems by manipulating an unsuspecting target. Social engineering attacks
are multifaceted and include physical, social and technical aspects, which are used at different stages
of the actual attack. This section presents an organized account of common maneuvers, strategies and
tactics used in social engineering attacks.
2.3.1. The Attack Cycle
The social engineering attack process was first described by Kevin Mitnick. He described it as an
attack cycle of four phases [15,16]:
1. Research: This involves gathering information about the target. The final result is dependent on
the quality of the information collected at this stage. The data collected is utilized in succeeding
phases and is of crucial importance in making the attack successful.
2. Developing Rapport and Trust: Various types of social engineering techniques are deployed in
this phase to ensure the victim trusts the attacker. The data collected in the first phase, such as
public name, employer’s details, and company details, are used to make the victim believe they
are truly dealing with the organization.
3. Exploiting Trust: Attackers manipulate human behavior and exploit trust and stealthily steal
the desired information. This can be executed in multiple ways, for example email spoofs, scam
phone calls, or malware installation.
4. Utilize Information: This final phase is also referred to as “cashing in”, where the information
gained from the previous phases is used to perpetrate the attack.
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Various researchers have presented variants of Mitnick’s social engineering attack cycle, providing
description variants and extensions. Since social engineering attacks essentially exploit an information
system by gathering details of individuals or organizations, the exploitation can be a single-stage or
multi-stage attack.
• Single-stage attack: As the name indicates, the attack is performed just once. The information
collected is utilized to exploit the users’ financial transactions for fraudulent purposes.
The single-stage attack ends after conducting the attack only once [3].
• Multiple-stage attack: A multiple-stage attack occurs when the information collected from a
successful attack is used to deploy one or more similar social engineering attacks. The time
duration of multiple-stage attack can be minutes, hours or even weeks or months. This depends
on the nature of the threatened person and/or the organization involved [3].
2.3.2. Social Engineering Taxonomy
Several experts have given numerous approaches to categorizing the types of social engineering
attacks, such as technology-based, human-based, online perception-based and intelligence-based.
Some combination of types may occur during single-stage or multiple-stage attacks. A social
engineering attack in the financial sector likely falls into the single-stage attack category since the
attack is identifiable after one incident. When analyzing the social engineering taxonomy in relation to
the financial sector, the approach may be interpersonal or non-interpersonal. Figure 1 shows two main
categories of social engineering approaches and some examples based on each classification.
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shoulder surfing and reverse engineering are some of the threats that fall under this section. Using
personal skills, a hacker may stealthily steal financial credentials through various techniques like
friendliness, conformity and sympathy. The majority of social engineering attackers avoid face-to-face
contact with their victims, but prefer to utilize electronic means like email, the internet or any other
digital media to exploit human behavior, betray the victim and achieve their objective. Baiting, website
spoofing, pretexting and phishing are among the most popular social engineering attacks through
digital media. The authors in [17] outlined the different types of online social engineering attacks.
Our interest is electronic means of perpetrating various kinds of social engineering attacks, hence,
a description of some popularly used online attacks is presented below.
1. Vishing: Vishing is a form of social engineering attack in which an attacker uses a phone call to
trick a victim to reveal sensitive information such as credit card number, pin code or detailed
home address. The attack exploits voice over IP (VoIP) technology since it is cheap, and the
attacker could be calling from anywhere around the world, with their identity concealed [18,19].
2. Baiting/Trojan Horse: Baiting uses digital devices such as USB drive or RAM to gain a victim’s
attention and perpetrate an attack. This technique relies on human curiosity to deploy the attack,
which in turn spreads the malware installed on their device [3]. As a result, the organization’s
internal network will fall under the control of the hacker.
3. Fraudulent Websites: With this attack type, the hacker exploits a victim’s trust, leading them
to access their fake website, which automatically downloads malicious files onto the victim’s
computer [16]. As with the Trojan Horse attack, the downloaded file gives the attacker access to
sensitive information from the local browser of the victim.
4. Pretexting: This is an exploit that uses a scripted scenario to trick the victim to reveal sensitive
information or accomplish other malicious activities unknowingly. Reverse social engineering is
the best example for pretexting, in which an attacker creates a scene or situation and an innocent
victim believes that the hacker can provide a solution [3].
5. Phishing/Spear Phishing: Phishing is the most popular social engineering attack in the online
banking system. Typically, a hacker sends an email using the legitimate organization’s trademark
to get the attention of their target. The fake email appears to be from a trusted bank requesting that
the customer updates their account information using the provided link (which is a bogus link).
The attached fraudulent website leads the victim to divulge sensitive financial credentials [3].
Phishing is considered one of the most effective attacks and the technique has become more
sophisticated over the years. Spear Phishing uses the personal details of a potential victim to
tailor the email content, with a higher probability of success [16].
2.3.3. Causative Factors
The US Software Engineering Institute [3], reported three contributing factors as the major
causative factors for social engineering attacks: organizational, demographic and human [3]. The three
categories, along with the sub-factors, are discussed below.
1. Demographic Factors: Gender, age, personality characters and cultural factors are the main
demographic aspects which influence social engineering attacks. These susceptibilities, however,
may vary between male and female, young and old, literate and illiterate and so on. A survey
conducted by Carnegie Mellon University revealed that women were more susceptible than men.
The reason advanced for this was that women feel more comfortable using digital media and are
more likely to reply to junk advertisements or commercial offers [3]. Factors such as normative
commitment, affective commitment, trust and fear are related to personality traits and contribute
to susceptibility to attacks [20].
Information 2018, 9, 110 6 of 18
2. Organizational Factors: Insufficient management and security policies can make an organization
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Strong cyber security strategies and network protections must
be ensured to reduce any kind of exploits. The lack of proper resource management and job
pressure may poorly influence human performance [3]. Organizational components can create
susceptibilities that attackers may abuse, directly or indirectly, for financial benefit. Failure of
management systems can also negatively impact employee fulfilment, causing discontentment
that could potentially result in the employee sabotaging the organization.
3. Human Factors: An individual may exhibit many emotions depending on their character,
surroundings, habits, or physical impairments. These emotions and circumstances may well be
utilized by an attacker to make an attack successful. Lack of attention, memory failure, faulty
judgment, poor risk perception, casual values about compliance, stress, anxiety and physical
impairments are some of the human behaviors that create vulnerabilities. Social engineering
scams, particularly phishing attacks, exploit human emotional flaws to gain unauthorized access
to information. Ignorance and lack of awareness towards cyber-attacks leads to the rapid growth
of social engineering attacks. Studies [21] have shown that the majority of online users have
difficulty distinguishing the difference between real and fake websites.
Table 1 summarizes the prominent features of social engineering attacks, the typical information
gathered, and possible outcomes of the attack. Although the methods used to deploy the attacks are
different, the data collected, and the intention of the attack remains same. Table 1 supports the premise
of this report by characterizing the attacks based on the approaches and patterns used in the attacks.
Table 1. Summary of social engineering attack characteristics.
Salient Features Information Captured Potential Consequences
Appeal
• Generally good news or
bad news
• Sense of urgency
• Delicate or
confidential matter
• Impersonating known sender
Desired response
• Deliver detailed information
• Update account information
• Click on link in
email message
• Open an attachment
Suspicious indicators
• Generic greetings
• Suspicious context
• Poor grammar or spelling
• Strange or unusual sender
• Incorrect information
• Legitimate embedded URLs
• Account information
• User name
• Password and PIN
• Credit card number
• Social security number
• Bank account number
• Bank routing number
• Email address
• Telephone number
• Other personal information
• Financial loss
• Identity theft
• Personal, confidential or
proprietary
information stolen
• Intellectual property stolen
• Computer compromised,
malware or virus implanted
• Data, software or hardware
assets manipulation
• Political gain
• Denial of service
2.3.4. New Zealand Banks and Cyber-Attacks: A Five-Year Review
In 2016, Symantec—an IT security organization—revealed that New Zealand’s global rank rose for
five out of six cyber threat types including: phishing, bots, spam, web and network attacks [22]. Internal
security threats reported by Symantec revealed that New Zealand faced about 108 cyber-attacks per
day and that it was becoming a growing hazard. The report noted that phishing traffic in New Zealand
ranked among the highest in the world.
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Figure 2 reveals that New Zealand, like other countries, is faced with cyber security issues at a rate
of nearly 10% of global cybercrimes. Global economic crime research, as surveyed by Price Waterhouse
Cooper [1], showed that 40% of New Zealand businesses had experienced security breaches in the past
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From the figure, it can be seen that New Z aland faced ore social engineering-based attacks than any
other attacks during the period under review. From Figure 3, out of the various types of cyber-attacks
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Phishing uses social engineering techniques to trick end users and gather sensitive information [23].
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In 2016, the percentage of social engineering attacks and phishing attacks was more than 60%
of the overall cyber-attacks in the New Zealand financial sector. Even though social engineering
techniques targeted individuals, the real focus of this assault was the organizations the individuals
where affiliated with. Phishing is as dangerous as social engineering attacks, particularly in the
financial sector. Studies [24] show that more than 37% of phishing attacks utilize the trademarks
of organizations and their traditional banking policies, while 21% of phishing attacks focus mainly
on financial credentials. These kinds of attacks undermine customers’ trust in banks, put banks
at significant risk of identity theft, and cause financial losses. Cyber security, especially in the
financial sector, is a complex and intricate challenge that is growing in significance. In PWC’s Global
Economic Crime Survey, the security team found that around 7111 financial firms across the world
had cyber vulnerabilities [25]. As technology advances, cyber criminals find new, sophisticated tools
for attacking and exploiting businesses. Legacy IT systems have become a risk factor to the cyber
security departments of major banks and the majority of financial institutions across the world have
spent billions on cyber security [25].
2.4. Analysis of Customer Behaviour to Social Engineering Attacks
The authors in [21] expressed that the tactics used by hackers reveal how vulnerable users can be
when online. Their study showed that the impact of “human factors” in social engineering attacks.
Cyber-attackers have historically relied on technical attacks to exploit their victims, but today, there
has been a swift change to the use of ingenious social engineering techniques to perpetrate attacks.
These techniques include: malware installation, the art of stealthily stealing user credentials, and
making fraudulent transactions. Figure 4 shows that in the past five years, the majority of email-based
financial fraud attacks were kick-started by human clicks. Figure 4 further reveals that cyber criminals
exploit the emotional weakness of human behavior by providing malicious URLs that link to credential
phishing. The attacks can be international; aimed at victims in specific geographical locations using
attachments in their local languages [26]. The impact of every attack relies on how the victims responds
to the online malware.
Information 2018, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW  8 of 18 
 
financial credentials. These kinds of attacks undermine customers’ trust in banks, put banks at 
significant risk of identity theft, and cause financial losses. Cyber security, especially in the financial 
sector, is a complex and intricate challenge that is growing in significance. In PWC’s Global Economic 
Crime Survey, the security team found that around 7111 financial firms across the world had cyber 
vulnerabilities [25]. As technology advances, cyber criminals find new, sophisticated tools for 
attacking and exploiting businesses. Legacy IT systems have become a risk factor to the cyber security 
departments of major banks and the majority of financial institutions across the world have spent 
billions on cyber security [25]. 
2.4. Analysis of Customer Behaviour to Social Engineering Attacks 
The authors in [21] expressed that the tactics used by hackers reveal how vulnerable users can 
be when online. Their study showed that the impact of “human factors” in social engineering attacks. 
Cyber-attackers have historically relied on technical attacks to exploit their victims, but today, there 
has been a swift change to the use of ingenious social engineering techniques to perpetrate attacks. 
These techniques include: malware installati , t e rt f stealthily stealing user credentials, and 
making fraudule t t tions. Figure 4 shows that in the past five years, the majority of email-
based f nancial fraud attacks were kick-started by human clicks. Figure 4 further reveals that cyber 
criminals exploi  the emotional weakness of human behavior by providing malicious URLs that link 
to credential phishing. The attacks can be intern tional; aimed at victims in specifi  geographical 
locations using attachments in their local languages [26]. The impact of every attack rel es on h w the 
victims responds to the online malware. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of human clicks and automated systems enabled by email-based financial fraud 
threats between 2012–2016 [26]. 
2.4.1. Online Customer Behavior 
Online customer behavior towards online banking depends on various factors, such as 
demographic characteristics, internet experience, perceived security and available services [10]. 
According to New Zealand Statistics, in 2015, the adoption of online banking was becoming 
increasingly popular among all age groups [12]. Table 2 shows the percentage of online banking users 
based on age group in New Zealand. It can be inferred from Table 2 that a high a percentage of users 
across all age groups use online banking facilities for various services. It is not an activity limited to 
youth, although they are more likely to interact with digital means of communication. In fact, more 
than 50% of senior citizens (65+ years) used online banking infrastructure. 
  
98.80%
99.00%
99.20%
99.40%
99.60%
99.80%
100.00%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Percentage of human clicks and automated system enabled 
email-based financial fraud threats from 2012-2016
Human/Click-Enabled System/CVE Driveby
Figure 4. Percentage of human clicks and automated systems enabled by email-based financial fraud
threats between 2012–2016 [26].
2.4.1. Online Customer Behavior
Online customer behavior towards online banking depends on various factors, such as
demographic characteristics, internet experience, perceived security and available services [10].
According to New Zealand Statistics, in 2015, the adoption of online banking was becoming
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increasingly popular among all age groups [12]. Table 2 shows the percentage of online banking
users based on age group in New Zealand. It can be inferred from Table 2 that a high a percentage of
users across all age groups use online banking facilities for various services. It is not an activity limited
to youth, although they are more likely to interact with digital means of communication. In fact, more
than 50% of senior citizens (65+ years) used online banking infrastructure.
Table 2. Age group distribution of the percentage of online banking users in New Zealand. Source: [12].
Age Group (Years) Percentage of Online Banking Users
15–24 68%
25–34 87%
35–44 81%
45–54 73%
55–64 69%
65–74 55%
75+ 35%
Convenience, time-saving and effort-saving are among some of the factors that attract customers
to use internet banking. With this huge number of online users, cybercriminals have an even greater
platform of attack. Most users (across all age groups) are likely to have been taught how to log on and
use their online facilities, but they may not have been adequately sensitized to being cyber vigilant.
The authors in [26] found that more than 90% of cyber-attacks in the financial sector were initiated by
human-clicks on malicious attachments while using online services.
2.4.2. Customers’ Perception of Online Threats
There is no doubt that online banking has become an established means of financial dealing.
The adoption of digitalization in the banking sector has created a rise in email communication
between service providers and their customers. Symantec estimated that the number of daily emails in
circulation was 190 billion in 2016 [21]. The popularity of email communication has further accentuated
its use by cybercriminals. Scammers use a victim’s personal data gathered from social media profiles
to create personalized phishing emails, which are highly convincing. This increases the likelihood of a
positive response from the target victim to a phishing attack. Figure 5 shows the results from a New
Zealand survey into the likelihood of online users opening email attachments or responding to online
requests or links related to their banking activities. It shows how susceptible online users can be with
regards to their online subscription services like online banking. This is further corroborated by the
authors in [21], that the percentage of phishing email in the finance sector was about 52.1% in 2016.
Among the key metrics analyzed in Figure 5, was online user’s perception of phishing attacks
when engaging in online banking services. Other metrics were customers’ level of technical knowledge
in identifying the threats behind every pop-up, web browsing and online advertisements. The trend
shows that men were more technically savvy than women, and hence, were less likely to respond
to suspicious requests. Also, users in the age group of 28–38 were more cautious in providing their
personal details online. According to Fu [5], a user’s security awareness is an important influential
factor for a social engineering attack to be successful. According to [5], New Zealanders are generally
trusting of people which makes them susceptible to attacks. In addition, more than half of New
Zealanders are unaware of the latest data breaches and security warnings.
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2.5. Impact of Social Engineering Attacks in the Banking Sector
Most cyber security study reports have shown that the increasi g trend in social engin ering
attacks o the financial sector aims at a nation’s economi int rests, and ot on specific customers [27].
Any cyber risk can affect a bank’s financial infrastructur , in addition to r put tional damage to
cu tomers’ trust [28], while he collective impa t of a security breach at few banks can cau e significant
co sequences t a nation’s fi ancial markets due to their interconnected ess with a natio ’s economy.
According to the authors in [18], one out of five call center staff at UK banks were engaged in fraudulent
activities. Social engineering attacks on the banking industry basically involve a three-step hierarchy
attack process of legitimate access, device control and credentials theft. Based on this hierarchy process,
the attacker compromises a victim’s security through social engineering tricks, and further takes
control of the victim’s computer system (mostly through malware). Finally, the malware mines the
personal information of the victim and sends it to the attacker [18].
In 2008, a survey conducted by Microsoft showed that fraudulent, phishing website-related scams
of banks accrued financial charges amounting to more than US$5 billion [29]. In another report, it was
discovered that a single social engineering attack at Wells Fargo Bank amounted to US$2.1 million
stolen in 2011 [30]. The Gartner Group revealed that, based on their estimations, US banks and credit
card issuers lose about US$2.8 billion annually due to phishing activities [31].
Figure 6 illustrates the depth of consequences of social engineering att cks on the financial sector
globally [32]. The three key factors i vestigated in the research of [32], af er a breach in the banking
system, w re (i) reputational damage of the organization; (ii) customer trust and; (iii) financial losses.
The significant impact of s cial engineering attacks on reputation in the wider m rket place accounted
for 21.9%, which is significant for any bank globally. This translated to a 28.6% lower level of trust in
the services provided by banks globally. The financial losses incurred as a result of social engineering
attacks amounted to 23.1%, which is a significant value, showing that people are very susceptible to
social engineering attacks.
In New Zealand, Price Waterhouse Cooper found that 29% of New Zealand organizations affected
by economic crime also experienced cybercrime, while 40% of New Zealand organizations expected
to experience cybercrime in the next two years [1]. The deceptive nature of cyber-attacks is such that
more than half of the victims do not even know that they have been hacked.
Security and data breaches have the potential to destabilize the financial sector and customer
confidence within a short period of time. Therefore, maintaining a secure banking system and
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protecting customers’ confidence is important for the survivability of any bank, and by extension,
the performance of a nation’s economy.Information 2018, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW  11 of 18 
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3. Addressing Social Engineering Attacks in New Zealand Bank
Social engineering attacks can be diverse and complex since the attacks subsist on the ability to
manipulate human b havior. Therefore, it is ecessary to dopt security measures in multifaceted
ways. Initially, proper security should be given to physical access to deny un uthenticated persons
entry in o a premise. Organizations must provide multiple control strategies based on the type of
security [5]. Technical-oriented social engineering may be allowed up to a c rtain lim by implementing
identity verification or multifactor a t entication. This helps monitor any online, fraudule t financial
transactions. Furthermore, implementing a general security policy for banks and their customers is an
important element to defend against social engineering attacks. The relevance and content of security
policies should be well distributed among the public via education and public enlightenment. Public
enlightenment has the potency of reducing users’ vulnerability to online threats while performing
online financial transactions.
New Zealand Banks have adopted several offensive strategies to combat social engineering attacks.
These include: fraud detection systems, exploit blockers, vulnerability shields, anti-phishing systems,
signature type detection systems, authentication methods and customer alert systems. In New Zealand,
fraud detection systems, authentication methods and customer practices are among the top three
offensive security practices adopted by banks to mitigate the impact of cybercriminals. A discussion of
the three popular ffen ive security practices is presented.
3.1. Fraud Detection System
New Zealand B nks like Westpac, ANZ nd ASB have some secure fraud detection systems to
ensure cu tomer protecti n while banking online. The syst m monitors all banking ra sac ions and
identifies unusual activities. It also perform authentication methods whe initiating inter ational
transfers. Verification codes and security qu sti ns attached to the account will authen cate the user’s
identity before completing any transaction. ANZ’s “online code” and Westpac’s “online guardian” are
examples of mechanisms used to authenticate that a transaction was initiated by the real owner.
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3.2. Authentication Methods
Banks use authentication methods to provide multi-level protection through the use of passwords.
This includes textual password entry, and the receipt of a confirmation text through the user’s registered
mobile phone number or email address. This enhanced security makes it difficult for hackers to guess
the password. In addition, security tokens are widely used to strengthen the authentication process.
If the bank is providing authentication, then the authentication is mostly done via the user’s mobile
phone [33]. This multi-factor authentication strategy is implemented by most New Zealand banks.
3.3. Customer Practices
Every New Zealand bank has emphasized the role of appropriate customer behavior when
conducting online banking. This includes the guidelines put forward by the banks on their official
websites for customers. The guidelines include safeguard steps to follow to avoid getting trapped by
spurious mail spams and bogus links. Banks advise their customers to manually type their bank login
address into the internet browser when they wish to conduct online banking. In addition, customers
are advised to look at the address browser to verify that the security certificate is genuine. Finally,
updating account passwords or pin codes on a regular basis and storing them in a safe journal can
protect a user from password attacks [34]. Banks regularly advise customers to use reliable anti-virus
and firewall software on their computers and keep them updated. Regular review of one’s bank
transactions provides personal monitoring of one’s banking activities.
3.4. Challenges of Secure Practices used by New Zealand Banks
Despite the security measures adopted by New Zealand banks, they still face many challenges in
dealing with the number of perpetrated attacks, including social engineering attacks. Public awareness
is considered a critical aspect for making customers aware of cybercriminals. While many banks are
providing awareness through media, including social media, reports, however, show that only about
30% of banking customers are well-aware of cyber-security issues [32], Banks have good professional
communication with their customers, but lack social communication with them. Social communication
implies informal, sociable bonding between banks and their customers. This creates a communication
gap and, hence, when there are poignant security breach issues, customers are largely unaware.
Apart from this communication gap and public awareness, technical policies can also be a
challenge in mitigating cyber-attacks, and keeping digital identities safe and secure is also becoming a
challenge. The authors in [33] expressed in their findings that the use of two factor-authentication is
no longer sufficient to keep banking data safe. They further expressed that for password protected
systems, an attacker can constantly monitor network traffic and, thus, find ways of intercepting
passwords to gain access through the traditional authentication system [33].
3.5. Mitigating Social Engineering Attacks
Research conducted by Longitude Research [32] surveyed 250 participants knowledgeable on the
cyber-security risks their organizations faced. The study was distributed across the retail (55%) and
commercial banking (45%) sectors. The study revealed that social engineering attacks were commonly
executed at multiple stages against target victims to break sequential layers of offensive measures.
The assault generally proceeded iteratively, and occasionally deftly to exploit an individual until the
last protective barrier point was broken [32]. The findings of [32] and the key challenges faced by banks
while deploying cyber security strategies are summarized in Figure 7. Challenges include technical,
physical, as well as individual, challenges. From the figure, the difficulty in keeping pace with rapidly
changing cyber risks is one major issue banks struggle with. Of equal importance is technology
limitations, like keeping up-to-date with the latest defense software and hardware. As highlighted
earlier in Section 3.1, limited customer awareness is also a factor of concern, as most customers are
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surreptitiously taken unware by attackers. In general, Figure 7 highlights the need for banks to take a
more risk-based approach to dealing with changing cyber threats.Inform tion 2018, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW  13 of 18 
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From the research p ese ted o far, and to effectively address he social engineering attacks
perpetrated by cybercriminals, a systematic analysis of possible attack patterns should be conducted
to help identify the steps by which an attack commences and, thus, when counter measures can be
initiated. We propose a simple mitigation model, as shown in Figure 8, to address attacks and the
steps to be taken at every stage of a social engineering attack. Our model in Figure 8 is based on a
single-stage soci l engineering attack, which consists of five stages of attack: researching the victim’s
personal information; planning and preparing the attack; executing the phishing attack; capturing
sensitive data; and lastly, exploiting this information. For every stage, a possible cause of action is
advised for an individual to take. Our proposed model could also be applied to a multi-stage attack,
as every stage in the multi-stage attack is also captured in the single-stage attack scenario.
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4. The User-Reflective Mitigation Model
Most organizations are astonished with the relative ease with which their networks are penetrated
via social engineering attacks. From studies [21,26] previously presented, it is quite obvious that social
engineering attacks are largely due to human factors, which allows them to easily penetrate corporate
networks and is, hence, a worrisome issue for organizations. The human factor has proven to be a
potent means of circumventing well-hardened hardware and software security systems, yet it has
often been ignored or considered extremely challenging to address.
This section proposes a user-reflective mitigation model to address single-stage social engineering
attacks. The model requires users to reflect at every stage that they may have been compromised and,
hence, a part of a social engineering attack. A user, therefore, maintains this reflective stance to avert
attacks. The model presented in Figure 8 provides the stages of possible social engineering attacks
against a victim, and the possible actions a victim may take at any stage to curb further attacks. Even
if a victim has progressed through some stages with the attacker, a victim could still identify from
our model what stage they are at and take appropriate steps to mitigate further attacks. The model
shows the five stages of attacks and the recommended steps a user should follow to curb or mitigate
the attack. The detailed stages and possible actions are given below.
i. Reconnaissance
At this stage, an attacker tries to gather as much information about a victim as possible. When a
victim is unsure of the party involved, the victim should limit the amount of details divulged to the
attacker. In fact, do a verification check on the attacker by confirming through reasonable channels the
attacker’s true identity. Also, users should limit the amount of personal information posted to public
domains like the social media. Lastly, if it is a transaction involving a user’s bank or organization,
the user needs to report it through the provided information channels.
ii. Plan and Prepare Attack
Users should only interact via organizational verified websites and not through e-mail links
received as these could be phishing mails. For email links received, users should always look at the
address bar of the site to verify the authenticity of the certificate of the site. The certificate of a website
can be verified by opening the certificate component of the website page and clicking on the certificate
a user wishes to view. Information such as the certificate’s issuing party, the validity dates of the
document, encryption method and other details are listed. Every browser provides steps on how
to view the certificate of a site. Users can search online and follow the steps provided to view the
certificate of a website. Conventionally, risky sites do not have valid certificates; thus, users should
be wary of these sites as possible scams, and hence, take appropriate steps to protect themselves by
avoiding such sites. Also, if it is a transaction involving a user’s bank or organization, the user needs
to report it through the provided information channels.
iii. Launch Phishing Attack
Normally, users are unaware that they are being phished through fake phone calls and spam
mails, for example. Under this circumstance, it is necessary for online users to be wary of suspicious
mail, phone calls and other tools that may be used by attackers. Some steps at this stage could involve
heeding the following steps by users and their organizations:
• Sensitizing customers/users with awareness materials on social engineering attacks and the
techniques used by attackers.
• Provision of supporting materials like news reports to buttress the seriousness of social
engineering attacks and their trends.
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• For fake phone calls from attackers, users need to be adequately sensitized by their organizations
to recognize potential attackers. A general rule of thumb is for them to never give out personal
and sensitive details like pin code and credit card number under any circumstances.
As a way of making sure that other users are aware, a report of such incidents should be made by
the user to their organization and possibly to law enforcement responsible for such fraud.
iv. Capture Information
Online users can receive unsolicited messages and phone calls. This, therefore, necessitates the
use of a good anti-spamming and ant-phishing defense systems on a user’s computer and phone. This
will help filter fake mail messages received. Although some genuine mail may also be classified as
such, users should always run through their spam mail to ensure that there is no important mail in the
spam box before deleting them.
v. Attack Culmination and Victim Exploitation
Data protection software can be utilized by users to store their sensitive information, including
passwords, credit card number, pin codes, and social security number. Even when an attacker gains
remote access to a user’s computer system, it is unlikely the attacker will be able to mine important
data from the victim’s system since the victim is using data protection software that encrypts all data
and passwords stored.
4.1. Ensuring the Success of the User-Reflective Model
The success of the proposed user-reflection model hinges on the staff members of an organization
adhering to the specifics of the model. In the following sections, we provide a system to ensure staff
take a continuously reflective stance while performing their activities online.
4.1.1. Education and Awareness
Educating and making staff aware is a necessary action that every organization hoping to combat
social engineering attacks should engage in. Every training programme should make it clear to staff
that they should never divulge sensitive information such as personnel records, passwords or even
sensitive office details. It should be made clear to staff that when they are being asked for sensitive
information, whether via email, in person, or over the phone, they are probably being subjected to a
social engineering attack and should refer to the proposed model (Figure 8) to avert the attack. Finally,
staff members or victims, while maintaining a reflective stance of their activities online, should seek
the advice of the relevant department should they suspect any situation they are uncomfortable with.
4.1.2. Monitoring
To ensure that staff adhere to the need for continuous reflection that they may be subjected to a
social engineering attack while online, and that they also utilize the user-reflection model to evaluate
their activities, a monitoring system is required to ensure this. To achieve this, the IT department of
the organization could periodically run a simulated social engineering attack on staff members during
their routine work. Simulated and targeted social engineering attacks like vishing and phishing emails
and generic spam emails may be used. The results should be observed and evaluated, following up
staff members who fail to identify the simulated malicious attacks. These staff members should be
further educated and sensitized to the need to be aware and stay safe while conducting their duties
online. In addition, staff members who are able to identify attacks should be acknowledged and
rewarded in some way. Figure 9 provides a framework summary for the deployment and monitoring
of simulated social engineering attacks in an organization.
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5. Conclusions
The evolution in technology offers both opportunities and challenges to the financial sector.
However, cybercriminals are also becoming ingenious and creative in their attacks, especially as they
exploit on human emotions. To improve the cyber security stance of banks, new way t ols e d to
be developed and deployed to fill the existing gaps created by these clev r criminals and to counter the
att cks they present. A holisti approach tow rds cyber thr ats is needed to elevate th threats to an
operational level, which could help in making b tter decisions quickly a d effectively. N t all threats
can be analyzed and prioritized as the same, but by examining the analytics of threats retrospectively,
banks could foresee attack patterns, and predict the possibility of an attack before it even happens.
We conclude with two remarks. Firstly, the New Zealand banking sector still faces, like the
rest of its counterparts around the world, social engineering attacks, and this threat is becoming
a growing concern. This study has discussed the effectiveness of current anti-social engineering
strategies deployed by New Zealand banks and the gaps that need to be addressed. The situation is no
different for other banks in the global arena. The global financial sector has found itself on a continuum
of an attack platform due to its relevance to the economy of any nation, and cybercriminals will never
stop at perpetrating attacks, but will continue to evolve ingenious ways to sabotage banks and their
customers. Secondly, the model we have proposed is poised to give users a continuous reflection while
online that the possibility always exists that they may already have been co promised, and hence, are
part of a social engineering scheme that they may not be aware of. Our model, therefore, helps users
avert or mi imize the effect of perpetrated attacks.
As i dividual data are becoming increasingly compromis d due to subtle ttacks that ppeal to
human emoti ns, perhaps the time has come for targeted investment into education and training. This
will no doubt reinforce the human firewall, with the aim of making users self-reflective of the fact that
they may already be part of an elaborate social engineering attack or may be subjected to attacks while
conducting their activities online.
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